March 1, 2011
Thomas (history, emeritus, Univ. of Georgia; Robert E. Lee) essays the decision making of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis in bringing on war and concludes that neither leader, or side, appreciated the nature and costs of war and thus acted out of imagined results rather than informed assessment. Politicians failed to consult and consider the judgments of the military that a civil war would be long-lasting, expensive in men and money, and uncertain in outcome. Thomas also insists that the approaches of both Northerners and Southerners to the war were limited by their own regional cultures, with Northerners thinking war would instill manliness and purpose and Southerners believing it would be an apocalyptic catharsis after a generation of sectional strife. Each side thought the other would not fight in any case. Intelligent and engaging, if also more speculation than demonstration, Thomas's musings will remind readers that wars should not be left to either generals or politicians alone. An instructive lesson recommended for any free people thinking they can control events, especially wars, simply because they think their cause is just.
Copyright 2011 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.
April 1, 2011
Given the emotional division over slavery, some forms of violent conflict between the North and the South were perhaps inevitable. But did that mean that the fratricidal, four-year bloodbath had to happen? University of Georgia professor of history emeritus Thomas asserts that sectional hostility degenerated into civil war because of a series of miscalculations, even delusions, on both sides. On the Northern side, politicians, beginning with Lincoln, assumed that most Southerners were loyal unionists who would refuse to support a wealthy, slave-holding minority. Other Northerners were contemptuous of Southern economic backwardness and Southern ability to create a competent fighting force. Southerners were equally contemptuous of Northern manliness and fighting capability, and many assumed that a few military defeats would cause Northerners to accept Southern independence. Few on either side contemplated a prolonged war. Many of these points have been made before, but Thomas forefronts them as causative factors in this informative and provocative work.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2011, American Library Association.)